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In our dynamic optimizing sticky price model, agents are heterogeneous with regard to their 
age and their productivity. We find that the business cycle dynamics in the OLG model in 
response to both a technology shock and a monetary shock are similar, but not completely 
identical to those found in the corresponding representative-agent model. In particular, 
working hours in the OLG model decrease in response to a positive technological shock, since 
for young workers the income effect dominates the substitution effect. This is in line with the 
adverse effect of productivity shocks on employment found in structural vector 
autoregressions. 
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Most business cycle research focuses on the behavior of the representative agent model
and neglects the eﬀects that are caused by the heterogeneity of agents. Notable ex-
ceptions are R´ ıos-Rull (1996) and Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gimin´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull (1998),
among others. R´ ıos-Rull (1996) considers a stochastic OLG model for the study of the
eﬀects of a technology shock. He shows that the business cycle dynamics of the life-
cycle model is basically the same as those of the inﬁnitely-lived representative-agent
model. Casta˜ neda et al. (1998) explore the dynamics of the income distribution in a
neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous inﬁnitely-lived households. They demon-
strate that ﬁve types of households are enough to replicate most of the ﬁndings on the
US income distribution business cycle dynamics. Both studies consider a Walrasian
economy. The present paper is most closely related to the one of R´ ıos-Rull (1996).
Diﬀerent from his model, agents are also heterogeneous within generations. For this
reason, we are also able to replicate the observed income and wealth heterogeneity. In
addition to both R´ ıos-Rull (1996) and Casta˜ neda et al. (1998), we introduce money
and sticky prices in our model so that we are able to also consider a monetary shock in
addition to the productivity shock. Furthermore, we calibrate the model period equal
to one quarter rather than one year.1 We consider a model period of one quarter to be
more appropriate for the study of business cycle dynamics.
In essence, we conﬁrm the results of R´ ıos-Rull (1996). The heterogeneous-agent OLG
model behaves almost identical to the representative-agent model. We, however, ﬁnd
one noteworthy exception. Following a technology shock, aggregate hours decrease in
the OLG model whereas they increase in the Ramsey model. In order to observe this
eﬀect in our model we need both the productivity-age proﬁle and the heterogeneity
within generations. A productivity shock then implies a heterogeneous response of
the labor supply among workers depending on their productivity, their age, and their
wealth. In this respect our paper provides another explanation for the negative response
of working hours to a technology shock that Gal´ ı (1999) and Francis and Ramey (2002)
identify in vector autoregressions. Francis and Ramey (2002) show that this ﬁnding
1In addition, we also apply a solution method that has not been used to the computation of such
large-scale stochastic models before. While R´ ıos-Rull (1996) uses a solution method that is only
applicable to a central-planning problem, Casta˜ neda et al. (1998) use the algorithm suggested by
Krussell and Smith (1998). Our study, therefore, is also of independent interest for the researcher of
computational methods.
1is consistent with real business cycle models that incorporate habit persistence and
investment adjustment costs. Our model points to the heterogeneity of workers.2
Our study also conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Casta˜ neda et al. (1998), even though our model
emphasizes diﬀerent channels of transmission for the productivity shock. In the Wal-
rasian economy of the model by Casta˜ neda et al. (1998), a productivity shock aﬀects
the factor prices and, hence, the income distribution. This eﬀect is also present in our
model. In addition, we model progressive income taxation and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. There-
fore, a productivity shock also aﬀects government taxes and transfers to the households.
These eﬀects, of course, overlap the standard factor price eﬀects. We ﬁnd that the dis-
tribution eﬀect of a productivity shock in our model is similar to the one in Casta˜ neda
et al. (1998). In particular, the distribution of income becomes more equal after a
positive productivity shock.
We further apply our model to study the fundamental question how monetary policy
aﬀects the distribution of income and wealth. Quite recently, this relationship has
received renewed interest. Easterly and Fischer (2001) as well as Romer and Romer
(1998) point out in their empirical analysis that inﬂation hurts the very poor. Galli and
van der Hoeven (2001) provide a survey of the empirical literature. Moreover, there
have been a few initial quantitative studies of the distributional eﬀects of inﬂation that
are based on general equilibrium models. These include studies by Erosa and Ventura
(2002) and Heer and S¨ ussmuth (2006) who focus on the eﬀects of a change in the
long-run inﬂation rate and, therefore, perform a comparative steady-state analysis of
the endogenous wealth distributions. In both articles, a rise in the anticipated long-
run inﬂation rate results in a rise of the wealth inequality. Erosa and Ventura (2002)
emphasize the inﬂation’s eﬀect on the composition of the consumption good bundle.
Higher inﬂation results in an increase of the consumption of the credit good at the
expense of the consumption of the cash good, and richer agents have lower credit costs.
Heer and S¨ ussmuth (2006) model the observation that not all agents have access to
the stock market and, therefore, poorer agents are less likely to hold assets whose real
return is not reduced through higher inﬂation. All these studies, however, refrain from
modelling the eﬀects of unanticipated inﬂation.
In order to model the short-run eﬀects of monetary policy, we assume that prices
2Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003) argue that the negative response of hours depends
on the treatment of hours as a diﬀerence stationary process. Modelling hours as a stationary process
they ﬁnd that per capita hours increase in response to a technology shock.
2are sticky and adjust as in Calvo (1983). Following an unexpected rise of the money
growth rate, we observe unexpected inﬂation. Prices and markups adjust endogenously
in our economy. As a consequence, both factor prices and the distribution of income
change. In addition, as mentioned above, income is taxed progressively in our model.
If there is unexpected inﬂation, the real tax burden of the income-rich agents increases,
the so-called “bracket creep“. We also consider the eﬀect of inﬂation on pensions. In
particular, unexpected inﬂation results in a reduction of real pensions as the government
adjusts the pensions for higher-than-average inﬂation only with a lag. Consequently,
following an expansionary monetary policy with an unexpected rise of inﬂation, the
non-interest income distribution becomes more equal, while the eﬀect on the total
income distribution depends on the distribution of interest income (and, hence, the
distribution of wealth).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the OLG model. The model
is calibrated in section 3, where we also present the algorithm for our computation in
brief. The results are presented in section 4. We compare the heterogeneous-agent with
the corresponding representative-agent economy and make the interesting observation
that the business cycle dynamics in these two models are not completely identical. We
also present the eﬀect of both a productivity and a monetary shock on the distribution
of income and wealth. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix describes the stochastic
OLG and Ramsey model and the solution method in more detail.
2 The Model
The model is based on the stochastic Overlapping Generations (OLG) model with
elastic labor supply and aggregate productivity risk, augmented by a government sector
and the monetary authority. The model is an extension of R´ ıos-Rull (1996).
Four diﬀerent sectors are depicted: households, ﬁrms, the government, and the mone-
tary authority. Households maximize discounted life-time utility with regard to their
intertemporal consumption, capital and money demand, and labor supply. Firms in the
production sector are competitive, while ﬁrms in the retail sector are monopolistically
competitive and set prices in a staggered way a la Calvo (1983). The intermediate good
ﬁrms produce using labor input and capital. The government taxes income progres-
sively and spends the revenues on government pensions and transfers. Both aggregate
productivity and monetary policy are stochastic.
32.1 Households
Households live T +T R = 240 periods (corresponding to 60 years). Each generation is
of measure 1=(T +T R). The ﬁrst T=160 (=40 years) periods, they are working, the last
T R = 80 periods (=20 years), they are retired and receive pensions. Agents are also
heterogeneous with regard to their productivity level e(s;j). The productivity e(s;j)
depends on the age s and the idiosyncratic productivity type j 2 f1;:::;neg. Individ-
ual productivity is non-stochastic, and an individual will not change his productivity
type j over his life time. The mass of type-j agents in each generations is constant and
denoted by ¹(j). The s-year old household with productivity type j holds real money
holdings M
s;j
t =Pt and capital k
s;j
t in period t. He maximizes expected life-time utility
at age 1 in period t with regard to consumption c
s;j
t , labor supply n
s;j
t , and next-period
money balances M
s+1;j





















where ¯ is a discount factor and expectations are conditioned on the information set
of the household at time t. Instantaneous utility u
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1¡´ if ¾ 6= 1;
(2)
where ¾ > 0 denotes the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.3 The agent is born
without capital k
1;j
t = 0, j 2 f1;:::;neg, but receives an initial cash endowment from
the government M
1j
t that is ﬁxed in terms of the beginning of period price level Pt¡1
and equal for the diﬀerent productivity types, i.e., M
1j
t =Pt¡1 =: m1 > 0 for all t and j.
The s-year old working agent with productivity type j faces the following nominal
































s = 1;:::;T; j = 1:::;ne: (3)
3We follow Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gimin´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull (2004) in our choice of the functional form for
the utility from leisure. In particular, this additive functional form implies a relatively low variability
of working hours across individuals that is in good accordance with empirical evidence.
4The working agent receives income from eﬀective labor e(s;j)n
s;j
t and capital k
s;j
t as





t+1 and money M
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The government adjust the tax income schedule at the beginning of each period for the
average rate of inﬂation in the economy which is equal to the non-stochastic steady
state rate ¼. Therefore, nominal income is divided by the price level, Pt¡1¼, and the
tax schedule ¿(:) is a time-invariant function of (deﬂated) income with ¿0 > 0. Notice
that when we have unanticipated inﬂation, ¼t = Pt
Pt¡1 > ¼, the real tax burden increases
as the agent’s real income moves into a higher tax bracket, the so-called“bracket creep“
eﬀect.






























s = T + 1;:::;T + T
R; j = 1;:::;ne; (4)
with the capital stock and money balances at the end of the life at age s = T +T R being




t ´ 0 for all productivity types j 2 f1;:::;neg,
because the household does not leave bequests. Furthermore, since retirement at age




t = ::: = n
T+TR;j
t ´ 0. Pent are nominal pensions
and are distributed lump-sum. They are not taxed. Again, the government adjusts
pensions each period for expected inﬂation according to Pent = pen Pt¡1¼, where pen
is constant through time. If inﬂation is higher then expected, ¼t > ¼, the real value of
pensions declines.
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s = T + 1;:::;T + T R;
5(5)







The necessary conditions for the households with respect to consumption c
s;j
t , s =
1;:::;T + T R, next-period capital k
s+1;j
t+1 , and next-period money m
s+1;j
t+1 at age s =








































































































































The description of the production sector is similar to Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
A continuum of perfectly competitive ﬁrms produce the ﬁnal output using diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods distributed on [0,1]. These goods are manufactured by monopolis-
tically competitive ﬁrms. Firms in the intermediate goods’ sector set prices according
to Calvo (1983).
Final Goods Firms. The ﬁrms in the ﬁnal goods sector produce the ﬁnal good with



























Intermediate Goods Firms. The intermediate good j 2 [0;1] is produced with




All intermediate producers are subject to an aggregate technology shock zt being gov-
erned by the following AR(1) process:
lnzt = ½z lnzt¡1 + "zt; (14)
where "zt is i.i.d., "zt » N(0;¾2
z).
The ﬁrms choose Kt(j) and Nt(j) in order to maximize proﬁts. In a symmetric equi-











where gt denotes marginal costs.
Calvo price setting. Let Á denote the fraction of producers that keep their prices
unchanged. Proﬁt maximization of symmetric ﬁrms leads to a condition that can be
expressed as a dynamic equation for the aggregate inﬂation rate:
ˆ ¼t = ¡·ˆ xt + ¯Et fˆ ¼t+1g: (17)
with · ´ (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¯Á)=Á > 0 and ˆ ¼t is the percent deviation of the gross inﬂation
rate from its non-stochastic steady state level ¼.4
4A detailed derivation of this relation can be found in Herr and Maußner (2005), Section A.4.
72.3 Monetary authority
The nominal stock of money held by generations s = 2 through s = T +T R, Mt, grows




The seignorage is transferred lump-sum to the government:




T + T RM
1j
t : (19)
The growth rate µt follows the process:
ˆ µt = ½µˆ µt¡1 + "µt; (20)
where "µt is assumed to be i.i.d., "µt » N(0;¾2
µ).
2.4 Government
Nominal government expenditures consists of pensions Pent, and government lump-
sum transfers PtTrt to households. Government expenditures are ﬁnanced by an income
tax Taxt and seignorage:
PtTrt + Pent = Taxt + Seignt: (21)
The income tax structure is chosen to match the current income tax structure in the US
most closely. Gouveira and Strauss (1994) have characterized the US eﬀective income











and estimate the parameters with a0 = 0:258, a1 = 0:768 and a2 = 0:031. We use the
same functional form for our benchmark tax schedule. The average nominal income in
1989 amounts to approximately $50,000.5
5We follow Casta˜ neda et al. (2004).
82.5 Equilibrium conditions
1. Aggregate and individual behavior are consistent, i.e. the sum of the individual
consumption, eﬀective labor supply, wealth, and money is equal to the aggregate








































T + T R: (23d)
2. Households maximize life-time utility (1).
3. Firms maximize proﬁts.





t = Ct + Kt+1 + (1 ¡ ±)Kt:
5. The government budget (21) balances.
6. Monetary growth (18) is stochastic and seignorage is transferred to the govern-
ment.
7. Technology is subject to a shock (14).
The non-stochastic steady state and the log-linearization of the model at the non-
stochastic steady state are described in more detail in the appendix. In addition, we
will compare our OLG model with the corresponding representative-agent model which
we brieﬂy describe in the following.
92.6 The representative agent model
In the representative-agent Ramsey model we are, of course, unable to model pensions
and to diﬀerentiate between working hours and eﬀective labor input. Everything else
is unchanged.












+ (1 ¡ ¿[(¼t=¼)(wtnt + rtkt)])wtnt + trt + Ωt ¡ ct:
His decision variables in period t = 0 are M1, k1, c0, and n0.
In this model, there are two predetermined state variables, the stock of capital kt and
beginning-of-period real money balances

























































= ´0(1 ¡ nt)
¡´ = ¸twt (1 ¡ ¿
0[(¼t=¼)(wtnt + rtkt)](¼t=¼)):
(25e)
103 Calibration and computation
The OLG model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the US postwar
economy. We use standard values for the parameters of the model. Periods correspond
to quarters. The ﬁrst T = 160 periods, agents are working, the remaining T R = 80
periods they are retired.
3.1 Preferences
¯ is set equal to 0.9909 implying a non-stochastic steady state annual real rate of
return equal to r(1 ¡ ¿0) ¡ ± = 4:5% and an annualized capital-output ratio equal to
K=Y = 2:1. The relative risk aversion coeﬃcient ¾ is set equal to 2.0. ´0 = 0:26 is set
so that the average labor supply is approximately equal to 1/3, ¯ n ¼ 1=3. Furthermore,
we choose ´ = 7:0 which implies a conservative value of 0.3 for the Frisch labor supply
elasticity.6 ° is chosen so that the (annualized) average velocity of money PY=M is
equal to the velocity of M1 during 1960-2002, which is equal to approximately 6.0. This
requires ° = 0:981.
3.2 Government
Pensions are constant. We choose a non-stochastic replacement ratio of pensions rel-
ative to average net wage earnings ³ equal to 30%, ³ =
pent
(1¡¯ ¿)wt¯ nt, where ¯ nt and ¯ ¿
are the average labor supply and the income tax rate of the average income in the
non-stochastic steady state of the economy, respectively. The calibration of the tax
schedule follows Goveira and Strauss (1994). We adjust the parameter a2 in (22) so
that the average (and also the marginal) tax rate on annual average US-income equals
the quarterly tax rate on average income in the model.
6The estimates of the Frisch intertemporal labor supply elasticity ´n;w implied by microeconometric
studies and the implied values of ° vary considerably. MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) both use
PSID data in order to estimate values of 0.23 and 0.28, respectively, while Killingsworth (1983) ﬁnds
an US labor supply elasticity equal to ´n;w = 0:4. Domeij and Floden (2006), however, argue that
these estimates are biased downward due to the omission of borrowing constraints.
113.3 Monetary authority
In accordance with Cooley and Hansen (1995), the quarterly inﬂation factor is set equal
to ¼ = 1:013. Money growth follows an AR(1)-process. For the postwar US economy,
Cooley and Hansen estimate ½µ = 0:49 and ¾2
µ = 0:0089. The initial endowment with
money equals 21 percent of the average disposable income of the ﬁrst generation. This
is about the amount of money held by the 21 year old US citizens according to the
1994 PSID survey.7
3.4 Production
The production elasticity of capital ® = 0:36 and the quarterly depreciation rate ± =
0:019 are taken from Prescott (1986) and Cooley and Hansen (1995), respectively. The
annual quarterly fraction of producers that do not adjust their prices in any quarter is
set equal to Á = 0:25. This value is smaller than the value chosen, e.g., in Bernanke
et al. (1999), who use Á = 0:75, yet it introduces suﬃcient nominal rigidity into our
model. Following empirical evidence presented by Basu and Fernard (1997), we set
the average mark-up at the amount of 1=g = 1:2 implying a constant elasticity of
substitution between any two intermediate goods equal to ² = 6:0. The parameters of
the AR(1) for the technology are set equal to ½z = 0:95 and ¾z = 0:007 as in Cooley
and Hansen (1995).
3.5 Individual productivity
The idiosyncratic productivity level is given by e(s;j) = e¯ ys+xj, where ¯ ys is the mean
log-normal income of the s-year old and xj is the idiosyncratic component. The mean
eﬃciency index ¯ ys of the s-year old is taken from Hansen (1993) and is interpolated to
in-between quarters. As a consequence, the model replicates the cross-section age distri-
bution of earnings of the US economy. The age-productivity proﬁle is hump-shaped and
earnings peak at age 50 corresponding to the model period 121 (not displayed). With
regard to the idiosyncratic component xj, we follow Huggett (1996) and choose a log-
normal distribution of earnings for the 20-year old with a variance equal to ¾2
y1 = 0:38
7We use data from the 1994 PSID data and wealth ﬁle. We included only households with strictly
positive cash holdings in our sample. Money is deﬁned as money in checking or savings accounts,
money market funds, certiﬁcates of deposit, government savings bonds, and treasury bills.
12and mean ¯ y1. The productivity state xj is equally spaced and ranges from ¡¾y1 to
¾y1. We discretize the state space by using ne = 2 values and normalize exj so that
Pne
j=1 ¹(j)exj = 1.8 For ne = 2, we have ¹(j) = 0:5 for j = 1;2.
3.6 Calibration of the Ramsey model
In this model we calibrate the tax function so that the marginal tax rate paid by the
representative household in the non-stochastic steady state equals the marginal tax rate
on the average US-income. The government’s tax revenues are transferred lump-sum to
the representative agent. Capital’s share is ® = 0:36 and ± equals 0:019, as is the case
in the OLG model. The parameters that determine the properties of the productivity
shock and the money supply shock are the same as those used in the simulations of the
OLG model. The remaining parameters are set as follows: ¯, ° and ´0 are chosen so
that
² the annualized capital-output ratio is the same in both models (i.e., K=Y = 2:1)
² the representative agent works n = 1=3 hours,
² the velocity of M1 is the same in both models (i.e., Y=(M=P) = 1:5)
Table 1 summarizes our choice of parameters for both models.
Table 1
Parameterization of the OLG and the Ramsey model
Preferences
- OLG ¯=0.9909 ¾=2 °=0.981 ´=7 ´0=0.26
- Ramsey ¯=0.9889 ¾=2 °=0.981 ´=7 ´0=0.106
Production ®=0.36 ±=0.019 ½Z=0.95 ¾Z=0.007
Market Structure ²=6.0 Á=0.25
Money Supply ¼=1.013 ½µ=0.49 ¾µ=0.0089
Government ³=0.3 a0=0.258 a1=0.768 a2=0.031
8The number of productivity states ne = 2 is already found to generate suﬃcient heterogeneity in
wealth and income.
133.7 Computation
In order to compute business cycle dynamics of the model, we ﬁrst need to compute the
non-stochastic steady state of the model. Secondly, we log-linearize the model around
the non-stochastic steady state.
The non-stochastic steady state is computed by solving the respective system of non-
linear equations consisting of the ﬁrst-order conditions of the generation born at time
t, the government’s budget constraint, and the aggregate consistency conditions. This
is a system of several hundred variables (strictly speaking (2(T + T R ¡ 1) + T)ne
variables). We employ a non-linear equations solver that takes care of the admissible
bounds within which the solution must lie. To obtain reasonable initial values, we
started with a simpliﬁed version of our model, where it is easy to solve for the optimal
time proﬁle of the capital stock. We expanded this model in several steps to the model
given above.
Thereafter, we log-linearize the model around the non-stochastic steady. This linear
rational expectations model can be solved by, e.g., applying the method of Blanchard
and Kahn (1980), (see King, Plosser, and Rebelo, 1988) or of King and Watson (2002).9
4 Results
In this section, we compare the heterogeneous-agent OLG model to the representative-
agent case and will ﬁnd out that the two economies display similar, but not identical
behavior, a result that is in good accordance with those in the non-monetary models
of Krussell and Smith (1998) and R´ ıos-Rull (1996).
9The method that underlies our computation of the policy functions of the log-linearized
model is explained in more detail in Chapter 2.3 in Heer and Maußner (2005) and applied
to large scale dynamic systems of several hundred state variables and controls in Chapter
7.2.2. Both the Gauss code of the non-linear equations solver and the computation of the
policy functions can be downloaded from the web side that accompanies Heer and Maußner
(2005). The URL is www.wiwi-uni.augsburg.de/vwl/maussner/dgebook/download.html.
The programs that solve and simulate the OLG and the Ramsey are in www.wiwi-
uni.augsburg.de/vwl/maussner/englisch/chair/maussner/pap/demp.zip.
144.1 The non-stochastic steady state
Our OLG model displays the behavior that is typical for this kind of model. The
wealth-age proﬁle is hump-shaped as displayed in the upper left graph in Figure 1.
Notice that due to the hump-shaped age-productivity proﬁle (not displayed) households
dissave during the ﬁrst 61 quarters (=15 years). Only at real lifetime age 35 do they
start to build up positive savings. Agents with higher productivity attain higher levels
of capital, money balances, and consumption. In addition, consumption as displayed in
the lower right graph in Figure 1 is increasing over the life-time as the discount rate is
smaller than the interest rate.10 Notice that the household behavior changes abruptly
as they enter retirement. This kind of behavior is absent from most standard OLG
models. Consumption growth increases at retirement, while there is a downward jump
in the real money stock. The reason is the presence of progressive income taxation
in our model. In the ﬁrst period of retirement at age 60.25, taxable income falls and
the tax rate on capital income is much smaller than during working life. For this
reason, the after-tax rate of return on real capital income increases. As a consequence,
consumption growth is higher, and the household readjusts its portfolio allocation. The
premium on the return on capital relative to the one on money has increased, and the
real money stock is reduced as can be seen from the upper right picture in Figure
1. Furthermore, labor supply (lower left graph) attains a maximum at around age 30
because the age-speciﬁc productivity is rather low at young ages. Labor supply also
attains its maximum prior to the maximum in the hourly wages because older agents
have higher wealth and work fewer hours. Notice that high-productive agents work less
hours than agents with low productivity because the income tax is progressive.11
In our economy, income and wealth are distributed unequally. The heterogeneity of
income is in good accordance with the one observed empirically. In particular, the
Gini coeﬃcient of total gross income amounts to 0.34 and the Gini coeﬃcient of dis-
posable income equals 0.31. For the US economy, Henle and Ryscavage (1980) estimate
an average US earnings Gini coeﬃcient for men of 0.42 in the period 1958-77, while
Casta˜ neda et al. (1998) report a Gini coeﬃcient equal to 0.351.12 The distribution of
10In order to imply a more realistic consumption-age proﬁle, we may have introduced stochastic
survival probabilities; in this case, consumption declines at old age. However, our quantitative results
are not sensitive to this modelling choice and, therefore, we kept the model as simple as possible.
11If we assumed a ﬂat tax rate on income instead, high-productive workers would work more than
their low-productive contemporaries.
12The latter estimate is a little lower and in better accordance with our results because the authors
15Figure 1
Non-stochastic Steady State
wealth in our model is also close to the one observed empirically. In our model, the
Gini coeﬃcient of wealth amounts to 0.64, whereas Greenwood (1983), Wolﬀ (1987),
Kessler and Wolﬀ (1992), and D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull (1997) estimate
Gini coeﬃcients of the wealth distribution for the US economy in the range of 0.72
(single, without dependents, female household head) to 0.81 (nonworking household
head).13 Our model only fails to model the wealth concentration among the very rich
agents. In order to replicate the wealth distribution of the top quintile, one had to
introduce entrepreneurship as in Quadrini (2000).
calculate the Gini coeﬃcient using only six observations to approximate the Lorenz curve.
13Huggett (1996) shows that we are able to replicate the empircally observable heterogeneity of
wealth in a computable general equilibrium model if we introduce both life-cycle savings and individual
earnings heterogeneity.
164.2 Productivity shock
In Figure 2, the impulse response functions of aggregate variables to a technology shock
"z;2 = 1 in period 2 (and zero thereafter) are presented. In the ﬁrst row, the percent-
age deviations of the variables technology level zt, output Yt, consumption Ct, and
investment It are graphed, in the second row, we illustrate the percentage deviations
of eﬀective labor input Nt and working hours (the dotted line), capital Kt, real money
mt, and the inﬂation factor ¼t, while in the third row, you ﬁnd the behavior of marginal
costs gt (the inverse of the mark-up), proﬁts Ωt, the real interest rt, and the wage rate
wt.
Figure 2
Technology Shock in the OLG Model
Following an unexpected increase of the technology level by 1%, output increases by
1.0% as well. On impact, eﬀective labor input increases slightly whereas working hours
decrease. Subsequently both eﬀective labor input and hours decrease. This result stems
17Figure 3
Technology Shock in the OLG Model and Distribution
from the reactions of the younger and poorer agents: the income eﬀect associated with
the increase of proﬁts and transfers dominates the substitution eﬀect of higher real
wages and they demand more leisure.14 Since older agents are more productive and,
thus, earn higher wages, and since for them the discounted value of the increased proﬁt
stream is smaller, their supply of working hours increases, which also explains why
eﬀective labor input increases whereas working hours decrease at impact. Given the
recent discussion on the empirical relation between productivity shocks and working
hours (see Christiano et al., 2003 and the literature cited therein) we cannot say that
this reaction is at odds with the current empirical wisdom. Quite on the contrary, our
model provides a possible clue to the negative relation between productivity shocks
14The reduction in proﬁts in period t = 3 also explains the spike in period t = 3 in the impulse
responses of eﬀective labor and working hours.
18and working hours. Inﬂation declines and most of the price adjustment takes place
in the ﬁrst period of the shock (period 2). As the productivity increases, both factor
prices (wages and interest rate) increase. In addition, proﬁts increase markedly in the
ﬁrst period.
The behavior of the wealth and income distribution in response to a technology shock
is displayed in Figure 3. Both, the distribution of wealth and the distribution of
disposable income become more equal although the eﬀects are small: a one percent
shock decreases the Gini coeﬃcient of wealth (disposable income) by about 0.23 percent
(0.20 percent). In order to understand these eﬀects consider, ﬁrst, the distribution of
market income, i.e., the sum of wages and rental income from capital (solid line in the
lower right graph of Figure 3). As explained above, the increase of proﬁt income reduces
the labor supply of young and poor households, whereas older and rich households –
for whom proﬁt income is a much smaller share of their total income – supply more
hours. In addition, the older and richer households beneﬁt from the higher rental
rate of capital relatively more than younger and poorer generations. Therefore, the
distribution of market income becomes more unequal. There are several eﬀects that
explain the more equal distribution of disposable income, i.e., market income plus
proﬁts and transfers minus taxes. Proﬁts and transfers are distributed lump-sum.
Proﬁts increase sharply in the ﬁrst period of the shock and they remain above the
normal level for several periods.15 Moreover, the real value of pensions also surges
in the ﬁrst period of the shock. The increased market income raises taxes and the
government’s transfer payments rise. In addition, richer and older agents pay relatively
higher taxes. The more equal distribution of wealth is a direct consequence of the
more equal distribution of disposable income, reinforced by the fact that poorer agents
increase their capital stock relatively more than richer ones.
We ﬁnd that the behavior of our heterogeneous-agent economy in response to a tech-
nology shock is similar to the one in the corresponding representative-agent economy.
In Figure 4, we compare the impulse responses of the aggregate variables for the repre-
sentative agent model (dotted line) with those of the heterogeneous-agent OLG model
(solid line). The ordering of the variables is exactly as in Figure 2. Qualitatively, the
responses are the same for all variables, except for working hours. The representative
agent supplies additional hours of work in the ﬁrst ﬁve quarters following the shock.
15The spike in proﬁts in the ﬁrst period of the shock also explains the spike in the Gini of disposable
income (dotted line in the lower right graph of Figure 3).
19Figure 4
Productivity Shock in the Representative Agent Economy
Even though the impulse responses for working hours diﬀer between the two models,
the reaction of output is the same. One has to keep in mind that eﬀective labor and
raw hours react diﬀerently to a productivity shock in the OLG model since the more
productive workers increase their labor supply relative to the less productive workers.
Since empirical research on the impulse response of working hours after a technology
shock has focused on raw hours, our OLG model provides a possible resolution of this
puzzle.
4.3 Monetary shock
An expansionary monetary shock increases demand. As prices are sticky and ﬁrms are
monopolistic competitors in the intermediate goods sector, output and employment
increases. The impulse response functions of aggregate variables to a monetary growth
shock "µ;2 = 1 in period 2 (and zero thereafter) are presented in Figure 5. Again, the
20ordering is as in Figure 2 except for the upper left graph where the response of the
money growth rate is displayed rather than the response of the technology shock.
Figure 5
Monetary Shock in the OLG Model
The percentage changes of output, hours and investment are small and only amount
to 0.04%, 0.07% and 0.24%, respectively. Inﬂation, the real interest rate, and wages all
increase. Notice that, in this sticky price model, we are unable to model the liquidity
eﬀect that nominal interest rates decrease following an expansionary monetary policy.
In addition, proﬁts decline. This is one of the major shortcoming of the sticky-price
model that has been documented in the literature.16
The impulses responses of the Gini coeﬃcients of capital, money, wealth, and income
are displayed in Figure 5. As in the case of an expansionary technology shock, the
distribution of market income becomes more unequal. The labor supply of the more
productive households is more elastic with respect to the real wage. Therefore, the
wage income of those households increases by more than the wage income of the less
productive households. In addition, the latter gain less from the increased rental rate
16See, among others, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997).
21Figure 6
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of capital services. Again, the transfer and tax system more than compensates these
eﬀects. Since the real value of pensions sharply declines in ﬁrst period of the shock
transfers sore by more than 30 percent. In the next four periods transfers are still well
above 1 percent as compared to their non-stochastic long run level. The additional wage
and capital income of the richer agents is taxed at a higher rate. As a consequence of
both eﬀects the distribution of disposable income becomes more equal.
The impulse response functions of the aggregate variables in the Ramsey model with
Calvo price staggering are graphed in Figure 7 (the dotted lines). Again the ordering
of the variables is identical to the one in Figure 5. Notice that the qualitative behavior
of the variables in response to a monetary expansion is the same in the two economies
for all variables with a minor exception. In the OLG model, there is a little more
consumption smoothing than in the representative-agent economy so that the capital
22Figure 7
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stock remains above its non-stochastic level for many quarters.
We conclude this section by a comparison of the time series properties of the OLG and
the Ramsey model. For this purpose we compute 100 simulations of 150 periods length
each17 and ﬁlter each simulated time series using the HP-ﬁlter with weight 1,600. The
time series moments reported in Table 2 are averages over the 100 simulations. The
technology shock and the growth shock are generated by the processes (14) and (18),
respectively. We use the same sequence of shocks for the OLG and the Ramsey model.
The ﬁrst column in Table 2 presents the aggregate variable. In the second and ﬁfth
column, the standard deviation of the respective variables are displayed. Columns 3 and
6 display the correlation with output, while columns 4 and 7 present the autocorrelation
of the variables in the two models, respectively.
17See, e.g., Cooley and Hansen (1995), p. 189.
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Business Cycle Statistics
OLG model Ramsey model
Variable sx rxy rx sx rxy rx
Output 0.89 1.00 0.69 0.89 1.00 0.69
Investment 3.79 1.00 0.69 3.73 1.00 0.69
Consumption 0.35 0.98 0.72 0.37 0.98 0.72
Eﬀective Labor 0.07 0.20 0.33
Hours 0.07 -0.03 0.19 0.08 0.33 0.17
Real Wage 1.09 0.78 0.43 1.08 0.79 0.43
Inﬂation 1.66 -0.05 -0.09 1.66 - 0.05 -0.08
Gini Wealth 0.07 -0.11 0.87
Gini Net Income 0.31 -0.33 0.52
Notes: sx:=standard deviation of HP-ﬁltered simulated series of variable x,
rxy:=cross correlation of variable x with output, rx:=ﬁrst order autocorrela-
tion of variable x.
The second moments in Table 2 corroborate the impression conveyed by the impulse
response functions. The two models are very similar. There are negligible diﬀerences
in the standard deviations of investment, consumption, hours, and the real wage. Ex-
cept for hours and the inﬂation factor the ﬁrst-order autocorrelations are the same in
both models. Merely the cross correlation of hours with output diﬀers between the two
models. Hours are slightly procyclical in the Ramsey model (rxy = 0:33) and uncor-
related (rxy = ¡0:03) in the OLG model. Notice further that the wealth distribution
is almost unrelated to output (rxy = ¡0:11) and the inequality of the income distri-
bution is weakly anti-cyclical (rxy = ¡0:33). The behavior of the income distribution
is in good accordance with empirical evidence collected by Casta˜ neda et al. (1998).
They ﬁnd that the lower income quintiles of the income distribution in the US are
procyclical, while the fourth quintile and and next 15% of the income distribution are
negatively correlated with income. Consequently, the Gini coeﬃcient of income in the
24US is anti-cyclical as in our OLG model.18
5 Conclusion
We ﬁnd that the business cycle dynamics of the heterogeneous-agent OLG economy are
very similar to those found in the corresponding representative-agent economy. Our
result is in very good accordance with those of R´ ıos-Rull (1996). Diﬀerent from his
study, however, we also consider a non-Walrasian economy with i) sticky prices, ii)
within-generation heterogeneity, iii) quarterly periods, and iv) a monetary shock. The
aggregate variables in our heterogenous-agent OLG model behave almost identical to
those in the corresponding representative-agent model with one exception. In partic-
ular, we ﬁnd that aggregate hours decrease in response to a positive technology shock
in the OLG model whereas hours increase in the Ramsey model. Thus, heterogeneous
labor may account for the observed negative response of hours to a technology shock
found in a number of empirical papers.
Our study also increases the understanding of the distributional eﬀects of monetary
policy. So far, only the long-run distribution eﬀects of monetary policy have been
analyzed in computable general equilibrium models, as e.g. in Erosa and Ventura
(2002) or Heer and S¨ ussmuth (2006). The short-run eﬀect of unexpected inﬂation on
the distribution of wealth, to the best of our knowledge, have not received any attention
yet. In this paper, we presented a model framework for the analysis of the distribution
eﬀects of unanticipated inﬂation. An expansionary monetary shock is found to increase
the inequality of the distribution of factor income, even though only to a small extent.
Due to the tax and transfer system, however, the distribution of disposable income
becomes more equal and gives raise to a more equal distribution of wealth.
Our framework can only be regarded as a ﬁrst step to a fully-ﬂedged analysis of the
short-run distribution eﬀects of monetary policy. Nevertheless, our model can serve as
a benchmark case for future work that may include a more sophisticated modelling of
the idiosyncratic earnings process and may even allow for a third asset besides money
and capital, namely housing. In particular, we suggested a framework that replicates
the following important channels of monetary policy on the distribution of income
18Diﬀerent from us, however, Casta˜ neda et al. (1998) consider annual periods rather than quarterly
periods.
25and wealth: 1) the “bracket creep“ eﬀect, 2) inﬂation-dependent pensions, and 3) the
response of prices, and hence the change in the mark-ups, interest rates, wages and,
ultimately, the factor incomes of the individuals.
266 Appendix
6.1 Non-stochastic steady state of the OLG model
In the stationary state state of the OLG model (constant money growth ¯ µ and zt ´ 1),
the following equilibrium conditions hold:
1. ¼ = ¯ µ
2. ¯ x = ²
²¡1:
3. r = 1
x®K®¡1N1¡® ¡ ±

























6.2 The log-linear OLG model
In our model there are ne[2(T + T R ¡ 1)] variables with given initial conditions:
the capital and cash holdings of generations s = 2;3;:::;T + T R.19 We summarize





















t =Pt¡1, j = 1;2;:::;ne. In addition, there are ne(T +T R ¡1)+2 variables









t ]0, j = 1;2;:::;ne, the inﬂation factor ¼t and
marginal costs gt. The initial values of these variables must be chosen so that the













t ;¼t;gt]0 the model’s equations determine the vector ut. The ele-
ments of this vector are


















19Since we assume that the cash transfer to the newborn, M
1j
t =Pt¡1 remain unchanged, we can
ignore these additional ne state variables.









² the rental rate of capital rt, the real wage wt, the aggregate capital stock Kt,
eﬀective aggregate labor input Nt, the beginning-of-period stock of real money
balances mt, aggregate transfers Trt, and aggregate proﬁts Ωt. Thus, ut is a
vector of ne[2(T + T R) + T] + 7 elements.
We seek a representation of our model in the form
































where the hat denotes percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady state value
of a variable.
We ﬁrst derive the set of equations (26a). The log-linearized Euler equations (6) are20
ˆ ¸
s;j
t = (°(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ 1)ˆ c
s;j




t ¡ ˆ ¼t
¤
;
s = 1;:::;T + T
R; j = 1;:::;ne:;
ˆ m
1;j
t = 0 8j = 1;:::;ne: (27)
The log-linearized Euler equations (9) are:
´
nsj











1 ¡ ¿0 ˆ ¼t;
s = 1;2;:::;T; j = 1;2;:::;ne; (28)
where ¿0 and ¿00 denote the ﬁrst and second derivative of the tax function evaluated at




















s;j ˆ wt ¡ rk
s;jˆ rt;









s = T + 1;:::;T + T
R;
j = 1;:::;ne: (29)
20We will use the ne equations for generation T +TR later to eliminate ˆ ¸
T+T
R;j
t , which is a control
rather than a costate variable.




t ¡ (1 ¡ ¿
0)y
T+TR;jˆ y
T+TR;j ¡ trˆ trt ¡ Ωˆ Ωt











From the factor market equilibrium conditions (15) and (16) we obtain:
ˆ wt + ® ˆ Nt = ® ˆ Kt + ˆ gt + ˆ zt;
ˆ rt + (® ¡ 1) ˆ Nt = (® ¡ 1) ˆ Kt + ˆ gt + ˆ zt: (31)
From aggregate proﬁts Ωt = (1 ¡ gt)ztN
1¡®
t K®, we derive
ˆ Ωt ¡ (1 ¡ ®) ˆ Nt = ® ˆ Kt + (1 ¡ ²)ˆ gt + ˆ zt: (32)
The aggregate consistency conditions (23c), (23b), and (23d), imply

















































T + T R¿
0y
s;j + (µ ¡ 1)˜ m + (m ¡ ˜ m) ¡
T R
T + T Rpens
1
A ˆ ¼t ¡ µ ˜ mˆ µt;
(34)
where ˜ m = m ¡
Pne
j=1(¹(j)=(T + T R))m1;j.
Next we derive the set of equations (26b). We begin with the log-linearized budget













































j = 1;:::;ne; s = 2;:::;T: (36)
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j = 1;:::;ne; s = 2;:::;T:
(37)
The Euler equations (7) and (8) yield:
ˆ ¸
s+1;j







































[(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ 1]
¸
ˆ ¼t+1






















j = 1;:::;ne; s = 1;:::;T + T
R ¡ 1: (39)
Note that in the equations for s = T + T R ¡ 1 we must replace ˆ ¸
T+TR;j
t+1 by the right
hand side of (27) for t+1 and s = T +T R. The remaining two equations are given by
the New Keynesian Phillips curve equation (17),
¯ˆ ¼t+1 ¡ ˆ ¼t +
(1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¯Á)
Á
ˆ gt = 0; (40)
and the log-linearized deﬁnition of the aggregate beginning-of-period real stock of
money mt := Mt=Pt¡1. Together with equation (18) this deﬁnition implies:
ˆ mt+1 ¡ ˆ mt + ˆ ¼t = ˆ µt: (41)
30The ne[2(T + T R] + T] + 7 equations (27) through (34) deﬁne ˆ ut for given ˆ xt and ˆ ¸t.
The dynamics of the system is then determined from the ne[3(T +T R¡1)]+2 equations
(35) through (41).
The log-linear system (26) is determined if ne[2(T + T R ¡ 1)] of its Eigenvalues are
within the unit circle and if ne(T +T R ¡1)+2 Eigenvalues are outside the unit circle.
This condition holds in our calibration.
6.3 Non-stochastic steady state of the Ramsey model
The stationary solution of the representative agent model is characterized by the fol-
lowing set of equations. Since real money balances are constant, the inﬂation factor ¼
equals the money growth factor µ:
¼ = µ: (42a)





The stationary version of the Euler equation for capital,








can be solved for k given our predetermined value of n = 0:33. Given the solution for
k we can determine y. The stationary version of the economy’s resource constraint,
y = c + ±k (42c)
allows us, then, to compute c. Finally, the Euler equation (25c) implies the stationary












We use this equation and (42c) to determine the value of °. This is all we need to
compute the policy function of the log-linearized model.
316.4 The log-linear Ramsey model
The log-linear version of (25a) is given by





ˆ nt ¡ ˆ wt +
¿00gy
1 ¡ ¿0 ˆ yt = ˆ ¸t ¡
¿0 + ¿00gy
1 ¡ ¿0 ˆ ¼t ¡
¿00gy
1 ¡ ¿0ˆ gt; (43b)
where ¿0 (¿00) is the marginal tax rate (the second derivative of the tax function)
computed at the steady state solution of gy = wn+rk. The cost-minimizing conditions
(16) and (15) provide two additional equations:
®ˆ nt + ˆ wt = ®ˆ kt ¡ ˆ xt + ˆ zt; (43c)
(® ¡ 1)ˆ nt + ˆ rt = (® ¡ 1)ˆ kt ¡ ˆ xt + ˆ zt: (43d)
The log-linear version of the aggregate production function is given by:
(® ¡ 1)ˆ nt + ˆ yt = ®ˆ kt + ˆ zt: (43e)
The deﬁnition of gross investment it = yt ¡ ct implies
[(y=i) ¡ 1]ˆ ct ¡ (y=i)ˆ yt +ˆ it = 0: (43f)
Finally, the proﬁt equation Ωt = yt(1 ¡ gt)) provides the following log-linear equation:
¡ˆ yt + ˆ Ωt = (1 ¡ ²)ˆ gt: (43g)
The ﬁve equations that determine the dynamics of the log-linear model are derived
from the economy’s resource constraint kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)kt + yt ¡ ct, the Euler equations
for capital and money balances, (25b) and (25c), the deﬁnition of beginning-of-period
32money balances (24), and from the Calvo price staggering model:
ˆ kt+1 + (± ¡ 1)ˆ kt = (y=k)ˆ yt ¡ (c=k)ˆ ct; (44a)
Etˆ ¸t+1 ¡ ˆ ¸t ¡ ¯r
¿0 + ¿00gy




00gyEtˆ yt+1 ¡ ¯r(1 ¡ ¿
0)Etˆ rt+1;
(44b)
(¯=¼)Etˆ ¸t+1 ¡ ˆ ¸t ¡ ∆1Etˆ ¼t+1 + ∆2Et ˆ mt+1 = ¡∆3Etˆ ct+1; (44c)
Et ˆ mt+1 ¡ ˆ mt + ˆ ¼t = ˆ µt; (44d)
¯Etˆ ¼t+1 ¡ ˆ ¼t +
(1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ¯Á)
Á
ˆ gt = 0; (44e)
1 + (1 ¡ (¯=¼))[(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ 1] =: ∆1;
∆1 ¡ 1 =: ∆2;
(1 ¡ (¯=¼))°(1 ¡ ¾) =: ∆3:
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